Crossroads of Opportunity and Innovation Lessons from the Tappan Zee Bridge Procurement

Since its inception in 1955, the Tappan Zee Bridge has served as the crossroads of New York’s downstate economy, linking the New York State Thruway across the Hudson River from Rockland County to the west and Westchester County to the east. Over the decades, however, the bridge, constructed inexpensively after the Korean War, became infamous as a traffic bottleneck and dangerous nuisance that required ever-more-expensive repairs. Between 2013 and 2017, the Tappan Zee’s six-decade-old cantilever bridge was replaced with a state-of-the-art pair of cable-stayed bridges, now known as the Governor Mario M. Cuomo Bridge.

As chairman of the New York State Thruway Authority (NYSTA) from 2011 to 2014, I led the procurement process to replace the obsolete bridge. By adopting and leveraging innovative practices from the private sector, the Thruway Authority procured the project approximately $2 billion (or 40%) under the federal government’s original estimates and ultimately finished on schedule. President Barack Obama celebrated the achievement as a model for American infrastructure projects.[1]

The Tappan Zee’s success proves that reforming outdated procurement and infrastructure procedures can unlock immense public value nationwide. This issue brief discusses the history of the Tappan Zee Bridge and its innovative procurement process and then offers lessons for policymakers and procurement leaders to unlock greater public value in infrastructure projects.

Upon its completion in 1955, the Tappan Zee Bridge was considered one of the most technologically advanced bridges of its day. It was the longest bridge in New York State, spanning a 3.1-mile stretch across the Hudson River from Rockland County to Westchester County. Though other parts of the Hudson offered narrower crossings, the bridge’s location came down to politics and money: Situated 25 miles north of the Statue of Liberty, the bridge’s tolls were positioned a mere 1,200 feet out of the jurisdictional reach of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, allowing the Thruway Authority to capture all its revenue.[2]

As Manhattan Institute senior fellow Nicole Gelinas wrote of the Tappan Zee’s construction, “it was one of the last bridges to arise under a vanished American way of doing things: build stuff first, ask questions later.”[3] Then-governor Thomas Dewey and Thruway chairman Bertram Tallamy essentially ran roughshod over concerns of the area’s residents.[4] Within five years, the project went from inception to completion, thanks to 24-hour construction, costing only $81 million, or under $1 billion in today’s dollars.[5]

Originally designed with a 50-year useful life and a maximum daily capacity of 100,000 vehicles, the Tappan Zee was frequently in need of repair. Engineers had chosen to design it in a “nonredundant” way, meaning that a single failure could spell catastrophe for the entire bridge.[6] Coupled with cost-cutting measures like a thin concrete deck, the bridge’s maintenance needs quickly swelled. Concrete fell from the bridge deck frequently, causing holes that allowed motorists to peer into the Hudson below.[7] Moisture entered through inexpensive finishes, progressively deteriorating the steel structure over decades of excessive strain, corrosion, and winter salt treatments.[8] By 2009, the bridge failed updated standards for seismic and wind events, further amplifying the risk of catastrophe.[9]

The Tappan Zee fell into such poor condition, in part, due to an explosion of traffic after its opening. By connecting the New York State Thruway on both sides of the Hudson, the bridge had contributed to an economic boom in the Hudson Valley. Housing and new commercial operations sprang up in the years following its completion, including new facilities for corporate giants like IBM, General Motors, and Kraft.[10] Car traffic over the bridge grew correspondingly. Initially, it saw 2,162 cars pass daily. By the following year, however, 18,000 vehicles crossed daily, mushrooming to 112,000 in 1990 and 144,000 by 2010, well over its 100,000-daily vehicle capacity.[11]

Bumper-to-bumper traffic began to plague motorists on the bridge almost immediately after its opening. Maximizing the number car lanes to seven—including one center lane that could be redirected during rush hours—did not reduce the congestion for which the Tappan Zee became known. With no breakdown lanes, traffic had to maneuver dangerously around immobilized vehicles.[12] The high volume of vehicles contributed to an accident rate four times higher than the thruway as a whole.[13]

By the end of the 1990s, the New York State Thruway Authority had spent over $1 billion in repairs for a bridge that was quickly approaching obsolescence and at increasing risk of safety-critical failures.[14] Near the turn of the millennium, it became clear that the Tappan Zee needed to be replaced. Former governor George Pataki began considering replacement plans, which originally were estimated to cost $9.3 billion but ballooned to $16 billion to include the capacity to support MetroNorth train service.[15]

Despite Pataki’s push for a new bridge and $83 million spent in planning, his plans for a replacement failed to materialize during his administration.[16] His eventual successor, Governor Andrew Cuomo, made replacing the bridge “a very important priority.”[17] The federal government estimated that a replacement would cost $5.4 billion, including cost overruns and other expenses typical for a project of this magnitude.

In June 2011, Cuomo appointed me, with unanimous confirmation by the state legislature, as chair of the Thruway Authority, granting me direct supervisory oversight of the procurement process for replacing the Tappan Zee. The project was daunting. Though my prior experience as a private builder equipped me well for dealing with contractors and the need to deliver the best value for the money, I had never built a bridge. Moreover, government infrastructure projects involve layers of bureaucracy and complexity not typically found in the private sector. And many public procurement practices are not designed to obtain the best outcomes through the latest innovations. Instead, they benchmark against past performances and stick to legacy procedures and specifications, even if these are suboptimal.

Upon my appointment, I intended to inject private-sector practices to deliver the best public value possible for the Tappan Zee’s procurement. As a builder and developer, I knew that risk increases exponentially with time, and that time is money. The failure to apply a business-like discipline to civic affairs, the failure to dig in, understand a problem, and resolve it—all of these would cost the communities around us in very real ways. To quote then-Thruway Authority executive director Thomas Madison, “while the pace was fast, the deliberations were thorough, and no shortcuts were taken.”[18]

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s estimated replacement cost of $5.4 billion was in line with other bridge projects of similar size and length. Governor Cuomo recognized that government projects frequently ran well above estimates, and not wanting to be stuck with a never-ending bill, he sought my assurance that the project would not exceed $5.4 billion. After doing some research, I told the governor that the project could be done for under $4 billion, but only if the state allowed a “design-build” project delivery system.

Design-build allows one contractor or consortium of firms to execute a single contract with design and construction bundled together. After a competitive bidding process, the winner oversees subcontractors to bring the project from inception to completion. This differed markedly from the method that had long been used in New York—and is still used frequently, especially in New York City: “design-bid-build.”[19] This requires, first, the bidding and completion of a design contract, followed by construction that is completed by another firm and under a separate contract.[20] The potential for delays and cost overruns under design-bid-build was well-known; when problems arose, the designer and contractor usually attempted to pass the buck for problems by blaming each other, often resulting in time-consuming litigation.

By consolidating design and construction under the same entity, design-build offered a more streamlined process and greater accountability for results. The system makes it easier to shift the risk of cost and time overruns from the government to the contractor, who has an incentive to complete the job efficiently. In short, the thruway’s ability to use a design-build model was pivotal in the state’s ability to complete the replacement at a cost far below original estimates and with far less inconvenience to motorists and area residents.

In late 2011, Cuomo agreed to push through reform. He secured legislation, the New York State Infrastructure Investment Act, which authorized the use of design-build in New York for a period of three years.[21] This made the new Tappan Zee Bridge the first transportation project in the state’s history to use that delivery system.[22]

After securing this authority, the Thruway Authority and state Department of Transportation selected the parties who were qualified to bid on the project. Because of the immense engineering and logistical complexity involved, these were consortiums of firms with different expertise, most of whom had international experience. After being vetted by multiple state agencies, four qualified bidders emerged, all internationally recognized to possess the requisite know-how to see the project to completion.[23]

This expertise would prove useful, because the Thruway Authority had not built a bridge since the mid-1950s—in fact, since the original Tappan Zee. In the intervening years, the state had lost the institutional capacity to oversee such a large and complex bridge project. The Thruway Authority’s annual capital budget for bridges and highways was less than $400 million,[24] making the bridge far larger than projects the authority undertook each year.

Instead of hiring various consultants—standard practice in public-works projects—I opted to take advantage of the know-how of the four parties that the Thruway Authority and DOT had qualified to bid on the contract. All had extensive experience with large bridge projects within the last decade, and each had specific strengths and competitive advantages. That meant they could contribute to improving the bridge’s design and ultimate success at no cost to taxpayers or motorists. All prospective bidders had an interest in building a constructive relationship with the Thruway Authority and its engineers in case they happened to emerge as the winning bidder.

Over the 10-week period in which the firms prepared their designs, the Thruway Authority’s engineering department met weekly with engineers from the four bidders to solicit their advice on practically every aspect of the bridge’s design. This allowed the thruway’s engineers to supplement their knowledge and experience and modify the project’s Request for Proposal (RFP) specifications. If all four agreed on a proposed modification, it would make it into the RFP.

None of the bidders had ever worked with a government partner that solicited ideas and advice in this way. This communicated to all of them that the Thruway Authority wasn’t willing to do business as usual. Our priority was the best public value for the project.

Thanks to design-build, the terms of the contract for bid put the risk of delay and long-term performance on the contractors, not the government and citizens. The winning party would be on the hook for $120,000 each day past the deadline of April 3, 2018.[25] Failing to keep at least four lanes of traffic open during construction also came with a $1,500 per minute fine per lane obstructed, which minimized the risks to drivers already accustomed to intolerable delays.[26]

The Thruway Authority further capitalized on the opportunity to innovate by minimizing major project requirements. This left the bidders free to design the most efficient solution. The span was limited to cable-stayed or tied arch structures, but bidders had almost complete flexibility to select materials and structural details.[27] The requirements did, however, specify a 100-year service life guarantee before major maintenance would be required, at an assumed rate of 140,000 vehicles daily.[28] This incentivized long-term thinking and provided assurance to generations of New Yorkers that they would not be on the hook for major unexpected expenses.

The focus on innovation and flexibility was especially important given the unique challenges that were involved in replacing the Tappan Zee. For example, the ground under the Hudson River is not uniform. On the Westchester County side, bedrock is relatively close to the surface, at 250 feet. But on the Rockland County side, the riverbed’s clay and silty soil extends for about 700 feet, making the bedrock practically inaccessible. Engineers therefore had to support the weight of the roadway with hundreds of friction piles—large steel pipes reinforced with concrete that don’t touch bedrock but use the frictional force between the sides of the piles and the soil to provide stability.

We also faced an unexpected financial challenge in the middle of the 10-week design process, when we received word from Governor Cuomo’s office that the $5 toll ($4.50 for E-Z Pass holders) would not be increased following the bridge’s completion. This put the entire project at risk, as bidders believed that without higher tolls, the Thruway Authority would not be able to follow through with the money. If bidders believed that the project might not happen at all, they would be unlikely to continue spending up to $500,000 per week to continue their designs. I realized the need to reassure the bidders immediately that the project would go ahead, regardless of what happened with tolls.

A federal procurement official, however, informed me that speaking to the bidders would not be advisable or standard practice—and if I did so, I would lose my vote to approve the project. Not doing so, however, would have meant jeopardizing the entire project—no bids, no bridge. Assured of the selection committee’s confidence in me, I decided to speak with the bidders and guarantee them that the project would proceed no matter what. They continued preparing their bids.

On July 27, 2012, the Thruway Authority accepted three bids: $4.059 billion, $3.99 billion, and $3.142 billion (Table 1).[29] The lowest bid represented a savings of more than $2.2 billion compared with the original $5.4 billion estimate.

At that point, many, if not most, large government procurement projects would have requested a “Best and Final Offer” (BAFO) from the bidders. Upon being asked by procurement officials whether I’d like to proceed with one, I declined. By all initial expectations, the project was going to cost at least $4 billion. Two other bidders were priced in that range. With a well-qualified bidder ready to take on the project for over $800 million less, I felt that there was little need for a BAFO. In fact, the BAFO might have even backfired: if the low bidder were to somehow learn that the competition came in at a substantially higher bid, there was a good chance that it would raise its own bid, while the others reduced theirs only marginally. And the federal government’s procedures regarding BAFOs required at least 90 days, which would have only further delayed the new bridge that New Yorkers desperately needed.

Table 1

Details of New Tappan Zee Bridge Bids

	Tappan Zee Constructors	Bechtel Tudor-Perini	Kiewit Skanska Weeks
Proposal Price	$3.142 billion	$3.990 billion	$4.059 billion
Project Duration	5 years, 2.5 months	5 years, 11.5 months	5 years, 11 months
Dredging	951,000 cubic yds	1,800,000 cubic yds	1,550,000 cubic yards
Number of Piles	964	1,387	1,392

The Thruway Authority’s 11-member selection committee then had to select which of the three bids to accept. Rather than being required to accept the lowest bid—which is often the case in government procurement—the committee had the option to select on the basis of “best value,” which allowed for considerations like contractor experience and the quality of materials and design. Tappan Zee Constructors (TZC), a joint venture of Fluor Enterprises, American Bridge, Traylor Brothers, and Granite Construction,[30] provided not only the lowest price but the shortest time (5 years, 2.5 months) and the least amount of dredging (951,000 cubic yards), both of which were far below the competition.[31]

We engaged the community throughout the process, organizing more than 120 community meetings that were attended by thousands of local citizens and opinion leaders. Some project developers simply tolerate input from environmental and other important interest groups, or even view them as opponents. But we welcomed crucial input from these groups because, from the start, we recognized how important it was for our project to be environmentally sustainable, and we were committed to honoring and protecting vital Hudson Valley ecosystems and communities. In fact, two of the most prominent environmental groups endorsed our project and its environmental plans and mitigation efforts. We even engaged local schools in the Rockland area, hoping to inspire the next generation of civil engineers, infrastructure planners, and those who will devote themselves to civic responsibility.

On December 17, 2012, the selection committee voted unanimously to accept Tappan Zee Constructors’ $3.142 billion bid.[32] The design-build, best-value process, coupled with the advice solicitation and specification tweaks, had produced its intended effect. It resulted in a qualified bidder, a bid substantially lower than original expectations, a reasonable construction timeframe, all with risks allocated to the bidder. The design-build consortium agreed to provide a bridge with a minimum 100-year service life before any major maintenance would be required, effectively providing a warranty of serviceability.[33]

On January 18, 2013, State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli approved the contract;[34] on the same day, the Thruway Authority issued a notice to proceed.[35] Construction began shortly thereafter. The project required more than 300,000 cubic yards of concrete, 110,000 tons of fabricated steel, nearly 7,000 prefabricated concrete deck panels, and 50 miles of foundation piles, assembled in place.[36] In all, about 7,000 jobs were created.[37] On August 26, 2017, traffic opened to Rockland-bound vehicles, and on September 7, 2018, Governor Cuomo held a major event celebrating the opening of the renamed Mario M. Cuomo Bridge’s Westchester-bound section, which occurred fully on September 11.[38] Today, the bridge carries about 2.6 million vehicles each month,[39] with ample capacity for future growth, such as options for mass transit. Generations of New Yorkers will rely on it to secure better opportunities for their families.

The state ultimately funded the new bridge through a mix of sources. About $2 billion came from the Thruway Stabilization Fund, largely derived from the proceeds of litigation against financial institutions.[40] Another $1.6 billion came from a loan provided under the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act, and the remaining $1.28 billion came from bonds issued by the Thruway Authority.[41] Because this was more than the cost of the project, the Thruway Stabilization Fund was also used to freeze tolls on the thruway, including on the new bridge, until 2020.[42] At the start of this year, the toll stood at $6.25 for automobiles using E-Z Pass, and it will rise 50 cents each year until 2027, when most drivers will pay $7.75.[43]

My tenure as chair of the Thruway Authority ended in November 2014, well before most of the construction occurred. As chair, I approved no changes to the contract, which specified the actions to be taken by the contractors at a fixed price, with some budget flexibility for allowances and contingencies.

In large infrastructure projects like the Tappan Zee Bridge replacement, however, issues frequently arise between the owner and builder, resulting in disputes and ultimately litigation. For example, change orders are not uncommon on projects of this magnitude. Anticipating this, the contract details a multi-part dispute resolution mechanism that requires the design-builder to exhaust internal and administrative remedies with the Thruway Authority before commencing legal action in court.[44]

In 2018, reports emerged that Tappan Zee Constructors was preparing to claim an additional $900 million in claims against the Thruway Authority to compensate it for issues such as change orders, delays associated with bad weather, lost time due to a 2016 crane collapse, and the need to accelerate work.[45] In 2021, it sued the Thruway Authority for approximately $960 million but dropped the suit and instead proceeded along the contract’s internal and administrative avenues.[46] The Thruway Authority created an advisory panel to assess the design-builder’s claims, which determined that the Authority owed the builders $101.5 million.[47] The Authority’s executive director, Frank Hoare, decided against that amount, and TZC appealed, per the dispute resolution mechanism, to the Thruway Authority’s counsel and chief engineer.[48] The dispute is ongoing.

Other developments have proven the utility and public value of the 100-year warranty. For example, in August 2024, the Thruway Authority sued the consortium for at least $6 million over the durability of 61 out of 191 cable anchor pipes.[49] The Authority has repeatedly stressed that the bridge is structurally sound and safe, and that the issue relates solely to meeting the bridge’s 100-year service life. If found to be below design standards, TZC will be required to pay for the cost of retrofitting. This demonstrates the design-build contract’s ability to secure accountability from one entity, the design builder, and prevent finger pointing.

Transparency was critical for the success of this project, informing not only what we did but also how we did it. This started at the top, with the appointment of a blue-ribbon panel that identified the best-value bid proposal. The Regional Plan Association was a key part of that panel, along with a host of leaders in design, construction, transportation, and public procurement.

We now have billions in infrastructure spending flowing over the next several years from the American Rescue Plan Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Tappan Zee Bridge replacement offers valuable lessons for policymakers and infrastructure procurement leaders on how to use those funds effectively and efficiently.

For Policymakers:

Design-Build Drives Public Value

Research and experience consistently demonstrate that design-build project delivery is superior to the design-bid-build alternative across multiple metrics.[50] On average, design-build produces projects far faster and with greater reliability in cost and schedule performance.[51] The Tappan Zee Bridge project is a dramatic example of how the model can scale to deliver superior public value for even the largest and most complex projects.

The collaborative relationship between the consortium’s designers and builders played an important role in the project’s success.[52] Had the procurement delivery system instead been traditional design-bid-build, this close, collaborative relationship would have been far more difficult to achieve. In fact, far too often, designers and builders under the traditional design-bid-build system wind up in court—delaying projects for years while taxpayers and motorists bear the consequences.

One of design-build’s greatest strengths is its ability to incorporate clear lines of authority and accountability via contract. Tappan Zee Constructors had strong incentives to reduce disruptions; traffic impairments or delayed completion would lead to hefty fines. Establishing these penalties further encouraged the firms in the consortium to work together, because failing to do so would lead to a smaller pie for all. And, importantly, the public is far better off when such disputes are resolved after the job is complete, as is happening now with TZC’s claims, rather than allowing them to delay construction. By contrast, Boston’s Big Dig project to bury the overland artery of Interstate 93 underground—a design-bid-build operation—was eight years behind schedule and over five times its original cost estimate, in part because of fragmented design and build responsibilities.[53]

In New York City, many public-works projects and agencies are still required by state law to utilize a design-bid-build delivery system, though the legislature has granted some city agencies design-build authorization.[54] Other state laws hamper design-build’s feasibility and stifle its potential. The Wicks Law, formally known as New York General Municipal Law § 101, requires most government agencies overseeing public projects of over $3 million that are not covered by a project labor agreement (PLA)[55] to hire four separate contractors—one for general construction, one for plumbing, one for electrical, and one for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC).[56] Mandating government agencies to oversee multiple contracts and separate parties increases the cost and complexity of public projects.[57] Fortunately, because the Tappan Zee replacement had a PLA, it was exempt from the cumbersome Wicks Law.

New York State law also uniquely regulates design-build in private-sector projects, though this has not prevented broad uptake among the state’s general contractors.[58] The Education Law, which governs the issuance of professional licenses, strictly distinguishes between design professionals, such as professional engineers, registered architects, and general contractors.[59] The state’s education department, which oversees licensure and discipline of design professionals, maintains that they cannot work for a general contractor on design-build projects.[60] The department allows for a single contract signed by the three major parties—owner, general contractor, and design professional—though the general contractor cannot retain fees earned by the design professional.[61] In practice, a single contract between three parties is rare; more frequently, the parties sign two contracts, one between the owner and contractor, and another between the contractor and design professional.[62]

If these contracts do not clearly delineate responsibilities and provide that the design professional’s duties are owed to the project owner, they may violate the Education Law.[63] Since a state high court ruling in the late 1980s that liberally interpreted the Education Law to allow contractors to incorporate design services, the state attorney general’s office has not prosecuted contractors for providing illegal design services.[64] But there is still a risk that the Education Department would discipline a design professional who runs afoul of the letter of the law.[65]

The most ardent opponents of design-build expansion are labor unions,[66] who fear that design-build contracts cut out more government functions and thus reduce unionized workforces.[67] For large projects spanning multiple collective bargaining agreements, labor’s concerns can be addressed in the PLA. Therefore, there is little reason to insist on the antiquated and slow design-bid-build approach.

But union rules can also add inefficiencies to large public works projects. For example, the unions wanted the steel for the Tappan Zee Bridge to be bent on-site, which would have added to our costs and created delays. We solved that by negotiating with the union to have 85% of the steel bent at the factory and the rest on site. This was fair to the union, in that it gave them work, and it was fair to the taxpayers, who saved a good deal of money by having most of the steel bent at the factory.

Design-build authority should be expanded to cover all public agencies statewide. At least 45 states and the District of Columbia widely or fully permit design-build, according to the Design-Build Institute of America.[68] And though the Design-Build Institute classifies New York State as widely permitting design-build, New York City is more limited in its ability to utilize the delivery system. Because of the city’s vast infrastructure needs, city agencies should be given the option to utilize alternative project delivery systems like design-build.

Leverage Private-Sector Innovation and Expertise

Far too often, government procurement operates according to a list of procedures based on past projects. This makes it easy for public officials to cover themselves in the event of problems—they simply followed the process—but it does little to guarantee the best value for the public.

Consider the use of materials. Salt sprayed in winter corrodes traditional asphalt roadbeds and steel supports. Add the stress of heavy truck traffic and snowplows that keep the blade too low, and roads can quickly gouge, causing damage to vehicles and requiring routine repaving every five to seven years. To address this, I asked the Thruway Authority engineers whether nanotechnology existed to improve the asphalt’s strength and resistance to salt and moisture.

That inquiry led me in 2015 to direct my foundation to make a grant to Cornell University for the benefit of the Thruway Authority. This effort, led by the pioneering Dr. Emmanuel P. Giannelis, the Walter R. Reed Professor of Engineering, has produced new, patented technologies to strengthen roads.[69] The new roadbed materials are far stronger and weather resistant than traditional asphalt, which will reduce the maintenance costs and inconvenience associated with repaving. The Cornell initiative has now partnered with Phoenix Industries, a leading innovator of equipment and materials for the modified asphalt industry, to perform second-stage testing, with the goal of introducing the new technology to infrastructure projects nationwide. These types of research partnerships between the public, private, and academic sectors can spur critical innovation, generating public value far in excess of the cost of development. However, it is up to government to incorporate innovation into the specifications outlined in RFPs.

Depoliticize Procurement Decision-making

Elected officials, and those appointed to important positions by elected officials, face great political pressure to please constituents and interest groups. But procurement decisions should not be about getting reelected or pleasing the powers that be; they should be about delivering the greatest public value. Throughout my time as chair, political considerations abounded; nonetheless, I felt that it was paramount to use my position to champion the public’s long-term interest. Removing politics altogether would be ideal, but it’s not feasible. However, public procurement decision-makers should be sufficiently insulated from political pressures to prevent undue pressure from constituents and special interests.

Nor should political pressure influence the maintenance of infrastructure. At NYSTA, we were pressured to resurface roads in upstate New York that did not really require resurfacing. When I asked why money was being spent that way, I was told that the local vendors asked for it and elected officials wanted it to score points with their constituents.

By rationalizing maintenance and improving financial management, we eliminated $25 million of recurring cost from operations, restructured $900 million in short-term debt, improved our credit rating, and avoided a toll hike for commercial truckers. We used new technology and analytics to address high accident locations to improve public safety. We moved to all-electronic tolls, which improved productivity and the customer experience while also reducing congestion in metropolitan areas.

For Infrastructure Procurement Leaders:

Make the Most of Your Bidders

Infrastructure project leaders should leverage the procurement process to drive innovation. All the Tappan Zee bidders had extensive experience building bridges around the globe, while the Thruway Authority hadn’t built a bridge in over half a century. No public agency can possibly have all the answers, especially for large and complex projects, yet many RFPs are highly specific in their requirements—which effectively says that there’s no room for improvement. During the design process, procurement officials who fail to solicit the advice of bidders are leaving better performance and cost savings on the table, because after the winning bidder is selected, it’s too late.

Bidders have real-world experience and an incentive to make the most out of inputs, thus if there is consensus among them that a change in the specifications would yield an improvement, chances are, it would. During the bid-design process, public-sector engineers should meet regularly with counterparts from each of the bidders, and if a consensus emerges on a proposed modification or improvement, it should be incorporated into the RFP.

Beyond that, project specifications should be left as open-ended as possible to encourage the most innovation. Keeping the bridge’s major requirements to a minimum allowed Tappan Zee Constructors to make the most of their exceptionally strong design-build relationship, which allowed for construction with a minimum of materials and dredging, thus lowering costs and speeding up project turnaround.

Beware the Best and Final Offer

Though well-intended, the use of BAFOs in public procurement can often reduce public value. In some situations, when offers are close in price and timeframe, a BAFO can result in some savings. But in others, such as the Tappan Zee project, where one bid is substantially superior to the others, public procurement officials should not be afraid to take the best offer. If bidders know that a BAFO is likely, they may make a high initial bid, only to lower it during the BAFO process, which results in unnecessary delay without much in savings.

Leaders of public authorities have a strong incentive to avoid the appearance of getting poor value for money. At the same time, state and federal procurement officials may subtly and perhaps unintentionally pressure decision-makers to pursue BAFOs, simply because that is the industry standard, but that impulse can lead procurement officials to request a BAFO simply to provide cover for their decisions. The aim of the process, after all, is to ensure that the bidders provide their lowest possible price. That doesn’t always work in the public’s best interests, however. Instead, procurement officials should focus on results: minimizing the procedural hurdles necessary to deliver savings and shorter project timeframes.

Inspire Confidence in Public Employees

Before I took the helm at NYSTA, I had many of the same preconceptions about civil servants that many private-sector people do: that government is inefficient, and that the civil service is a place for people who couldn’t make it in the private sector and are complacently waiting to retire with their generous pensions. What I found instead were highly qualified, seasoned professionals—like our chief engineer—who were struggling to do a job in a system that cheapens their work and disincentivizes them, while punishing risk-taking and innovation.

The second shock was that there were civil service workers who had served for decades but had never received any recognition. That’s because the civil service doesn’t have access to the kinds of rewards that can be offered in the private sector. For the holidays in 2011, I did a very simple thing: I ordered an embossed chocolate coin for each of the 3,200 NYSTA employees, paid for from my personal funds and sent with a holiday greeting from me as chair. One day I passed the desk of one of our employees. I noticed she hadn’t eaten her chocolate, and I asked why. She replied that she wanted to keep it and to look at it because it was the first time in 40 years that anyone had given her any recognition.

Public workers are largely diligent and dutiful, but traditional project delivery prioritizes process over outcomes. Nonetheless, procurement officials should make it a priority to motivate their employees.

Entrepreneurial instincts—so ingrained in the running of a private business that they’re practically muscle memory—can also help guide the process in public-sector projects in ways that complement the highly talented government experts tasked with giant civil engineering responsibilities.

Instilling confidence is equally important when dealing with boards of directors or bid-selection committees. When the Tappan Zee bidders were preparing to cease their design work after learning that the toll would not be increased, I lost my ability to vote on the selection because I reached out to the bidders. This was unorthodox in public procurement, but it was necessary, the decision made easier for me by the election committee’s assurance of their trust in me. Not having a vote would ultimately prove immaterial; the selection committee would make an informed judgment based on the facts and my recommendation. I knew they would make the right call—but they did first have to have at least some bids to consider.

The Tappan Zee Bridge’s original construction and replacement represent important milestones in the history of American public infrastructure. Not only have both bridges opened opportunities for generations of New Yorkers, but they set new standards for creating value through public procurement. Combining innovative design, construction, materials, and engineering, the renamed Mario M. Cuomo Bridge stands as a testament to what the public and private sectors can accomplish when they work collaboratively to serve the public’s best interests.

Howard P. Milstein is chairman, president and chief executive officer of New York Private Bank & Trust and its operating bank, Emigrant Bank, and chairman of Milstein Properties. In 2011, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo selected Howard to serve as the chairman of the New York State Thruway Authority, a position he held until 2014. During his tenure, he led the procurement process for the new Tappan Zee Bridge replacement, the largest design-build public-infrastructure project in the United States at the time. In recognition of his accomplishments on the bridge replacement, Howard received the Regional Plan Association’s Lifetime Achievement Award in 2013.

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