The New GOP Survey Analysis of Americans Overall, Today’s Republican Coalition, and the Minorities of MAGA

A new national survey conducted by the Manhattan Institute examines today’s Republican Party and the coalition assembled by Donald Trump in 2024. It is one of the most exhaustive studies to date of the emerging multi-ethnic, working-class GOP: nearly 3,000 voters—including large oversamples of black and Hispanic Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters—were asked about a wide range of policy issues, as well as identity politics, populism, conspiracy theories, antisemitism, and other forms of racial bias.

This study will help to shed light on the central question confronting the modern Republican Party: can President Trump’s coalition remain cohesive once he exits the stage? Or is it inherently unstable? The GOP is navigating generational and ideological tensions that cut across old factional lines—differences in leadership style, cultural priorities, institutional trust, and the worldview of younger, more disaffected, and increasingly diverse new entrants.

The findings point to a coalition that is divided into two broad segments. The majority segment—longstanding Republicans who have backed the party for many years—are consistently conservative on economic, foreign policy, and social issues. They favor lower taxes, take a hawkish view of China, remain firmly pro-Israel, and are highly skeptical of progressive agendas on transgender and DEI issues.

But a sizeable minority—new entrants to the GOP coalition over the past two presidential cycles—look markedly different. Younger, more racially diverse, and more likely to have voted for Democratic candidates in the recent past, this group diverges sharply from the party’s core. They are more likely, often substantially more likely, to hold progressive views across nearly every major policy domain. They are more supportive of left-leaning economic policies, more favorable toward China, more critical of Israel, and more liberal on issues ranging from migration to DEI initiatives. A significant share also report openly racist or antisemitic views and express potential support for political violence. Yet they overwhelmingly identify as Republicans today and voted for Donald Trump in 2024.

For this analysis, Current GOP refers to (1) all 2024 Trump voters, regardless of party registration, and (2) all registered Republicans, including those who did not vote for Trump. To understand the structure of this coalition more precisely, the Trump/GOP electorate is divided into two analytically distinct blocs:

• Core Republicans (65%)—longstanding GOP voters who have consistently backed Republican presidential nominees since 2016 or earlier; and
• New Entrant Republicans (29%)—recent first-time GOP presidential voters, including those who supported Democrats in 2016 or 2020 or were too young to vote in cycles before 2020.

The survey’s first major finding is that the overwhelming majority of the Current GOP reject racism, antisemitism, and conspiratorial thinking in politics. But a meaningful minority—17%—meets our definition of Anti-Jewish Republicans. A respondent falls into this category if they (1) self-identify as both racist and antisemitic and express Holocaust denial or describe Israel as a colonial state, or (2) do not self-identify that way but nevertheless hold both of those extreme positions. Anti-Jewish Republicans are typically younger, disproportionately male, more likely to be college-educated, and significantly more likely to be New Entrant Republicans. They are also more racially diverse. Consistent church attendance is one of the strongest predictors of rejecting these attitudes; infrequent church attendance is, all else equal, one of the strongest predictors of falling into this segment.

Crucially, these views are not unique to Republicans. The survey finds slightly higher levels of Anti-Jewish sentiment among Democrats—20%, compared to 17% among Republicans. And despite these internal differences, both Core Republicans and New Entrants remain overwhelmingly favorable toward Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance. This is not a coalition in revolt against its leadership.

Where the divide becomes electorally significant is in partisan stability. Only 56% of New Entrant Republicans say they would “definitely” support a Republican in the 2026 congressional elections, compared with 70% of Core Republicans. The same New Entrant bloc is more likely to express tolerance for racist or antisemitic speech, more likely to support political violence, more conspiratorial, and—on core policy questions—considerably more liberal than the party’s traditional base. These voters are drawn to Trump but are not reliably attached to the Republican Party.

The picture that emerges is one of a GOP with a solid, cohesive core and a younger, ideologically unstable outer ring—a coalition that is broader than any Republican coalition in recent memory, but also more internally contradictory and harder to manage. Understanding which voters are likely to stay, which can be integrated into a durable conservative coalition, and which may drift away, will be central to the GOP’s strategic future. This report provides the empirical grounding for that conversation.

Full Results Available: Toplines, Crosstabs

Between October 15 and 26, 2025, the Manhattan Institute surveyed four separate national audiences: 1,493 Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, 301 black Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, 501 Hispanic Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, and 500 additional registered voters overall. The sample was reached primarily via online panels (2,172 interviews) with an SMS-to-web component (623 respondents).

While also reported separately, the black, Hispanic, and general GOP voters were merged into one national GOP sample and weighted to reflect Republicans nationwide on gender, age, ethnicity, density (i.e. suburban, urban, rural), and region. When referred to specifically, black and Hispanic voters are treated as separate, unweighted samples. U.S. voters overall were weighted to be representative of registered voters nationwide, using the voter file.

The margin of error is ±2.0% for the general GOP sample, ±5.6% for the black GOP sample, ±4.4% for the Hispanic GOP sample, and ±4.4% for the registered voter sample.

Figure 1: Favorability Toward Figures on the American Right

Less than one year into his second term, President Trump continues to hold very high favorability ratings among the Current GOP. Nine-in-ten nationwide say they have a favorable view of the president. Vice President JD Vance receives similarly strong marks. Hispanic GOP voters show no signs of fading support for the president: 89% view Trump favorably, with only 12% viewing him unfavorably.

New Entrant Republicans view both Trump and Vance less positively, but this reflects a broader pattern. They rate every figure tested more negatively. As later sections show, they are more skeptical and, in several policy areas, more progressive than the rest of the GOP coalition.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio is highly popular among Hispanic Republicans (83% favorable, 11% unfavorable) and performs slightly less well with the Current GOP overall (75% favorable, 14% unfavorable).

We also tested several right-of-center media figures. Tucker Carlson is viewed favorably by 63% of the Current GOP (38% somewhat favorable, 25% very favorable), with 21% viewing him unfavorably. Gender is one of the clearest divides on Carlson: he is much more popular among Current GOP men (68% favorable) than Current GOP women (57%), and especially among Current GOP men under 50 (70%), compared with 56% of Current GOP women under 50.

Among the Current GOP, Candace Owens is the most divisive figure tested. Half view her favorably (31% somewhat favorable, 19% very favorable), while 23% view her unfavorably. Age and gender strongly shape views of Owens: voters under 50 are significantly more favorable (62%) than those over 50 (42%), and men (56%) are more positive than women (42%). Owens also generates the most support among New Entrant Republicans (58%) and black Republicans (62%).

Notably, there is little to no relationship between being an Anti-Jewish Republican and holding a favorable view of either Carlson or Owens. While both figures loom large in online discourse, their followings do not map cleanly onto attitudinal divisions inside the GOP electorate.

With a net favorability among all U.S. voters of +14%, Ben Shapiro is a significantly more popular figure nationally than Carlson, Owens, Trump, or Vance.

Figure 2: Preferred Leadership Style and Views on Societal Femininity

Overall, the Current GOP prefers “a bold, attention-grabbing leader who often makes headlines and isn’t afraid of conflict or drama” over “a steady, low-profile leader who focuses on results without being constantly in the spotlight.” The largest divides on this question are across education and race: college graduates slightly prefer a steady leader (52% steady to 45% bold), while non-graduates prefer bold leadership (53% to 39%). Hispanic Republicans express a particularly strong preference for a bold leader (56% to 35%).

The Current GOP overwhelmingly—69% to 24%—believes that American society is “too feminine” and that more masculine thinking is needed. Men are the most likely to hold this view (78% to 17%), but women also agree by a substantial margin (58% to 31%). Support is especially high among black Republicans (77% to 19%) and Hispanic Republicans (75% to 21%).

The data also provide evidence for a broader generational and educational backlash among younger conservatives, particularly men. Although college graduates in the general population are less likely to support Trump, college-educated Republicans are more likely than their non-college counterparts to endorse the view that society has become too feminine. Younger Republican men, who have experienced these dynamics most directly, express the strongest support: 83% of Current GOP men under 50 agree, and nearly half (46%) strongly agree.

Figure 3: Views on the American System, Rules, and Health

Despite strong support for a more masculine cultural posture, very few within the Current GOP believe that America’s economic and social system is so rigged that it should be “burned down.” Only 7% endorse that view. A majority (52%) say the system is not perfect but should be reformed—fixing what is broken while protecting what works. Just under four in ten (37%) take the more cautious view that the system should be preserved, with changes made carefully and gradually.

Support for “burn it down” remains a marginal position—generally below 12%—across nearly every GOP subgroup: white, black, Hispanic, younger voters, older voters, college-educated, non-college, New Entrant Republicans, and Core Republicans.

The coalition is similarly united on the importance of following rules. 84% percent say society should enforce rules and punish those who break them, compared with only 11% who say it is fair to bend rules to keep up with others who break them. Support for rule-breaking, as well as other anti-social attitudes, is more common among younger and New Entrant Republicans. 22% percent of the Current GOP coalition that is under 50, and 22% of New Entrants, endorse rule-breaking, compared with only 3% of Current GOP over 50 and 6% of Core Republicans.

Views on health are more divided. Four in ten within the Current GOP (41%) endorse the view that modern medicine often does more harm than good—a sentiment associated with HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s Make America Healthy Again (MAHA) movement—while 49% agree with the more establishment view that modern medicine, including vaccines, is essential to public health. Black and Hispanic Republicans are more likely to endorse the MAHA position (50% vs. 41% among black Republicans; 54% vs. 36% among Hispanic Republicans). Gender also plays a role, with women—especially women under 50—more likely than men to support the MAHA perspective.

The survey also examined how respondents react to, and whether they personally endorse, statements that are often labeled as conspiracy theories. The conspiratorial views tested varied in plausibility and in the alleged perpetrator. From these data, we also report a combined metric identifying those who believe all or almost all of the six theories tested.

Overall, one in five in the Current GOP (18%) believe five or six of the theories. Levels are higher among black Republican voters (25%) and lower among Hispanic Republican voters (13%). Members of the Current GOP are also more likely to endorse these theories than the general population (13%).

Figure 4: Belief in Oft-Labeled Conspiracies

A stark divide emerges between newer and long-standing Republicans: 34% of New Entrant Republican voters believe most or all of the theories, compared with 11% of Core Republicans. Put another way: 63% of the highest-conspiracy believers previously voted for Obama, Clinton, or Biden at least once since 2008.

This dynamic does not reflect a traditional conservative vs. MAGA split. Self-identified “traditional conservatives” are actually more likely than MAGA identifiers to believe most or all theories (24% vs. 15%). The divide instead reflects the contrast between newer entrants to the GOP and those who have been consistent Republican voters for years.

On specific theories:

• The 2020 election: Just over half of the Current GOP (51%) believes that the 2020 U.S. presidential election was fraudulent, while 41% say that view is probably or definitely false. Among New Entrant Republicans, support for this belief rises to 60%.
• Vaccines and autism: One in three in the Current GOP (33%) believe that childhood vaccines cause autism. This view is more common among college graduates (42%) than non-graduates (29%), and among New Entrant Republicans (47%).
• 9/11 conspiracies: Four in ten in the Current GOP (41%) believe that the 9/11 attacks were likely orchestrated or permitted by U.S. government actors. Belief is highest among men (48%), college graduates (51%), Republicans under 50 (53%, compared with 34% of those over 50), and New Entrant Republicans (53%). Among black GOP voters the figure is 58%, and among Hispanic GOP voters, 56%.
• Holocaust denial or minimization: Nearly four in ten in the Current GOP (37%) believe the Holocaust was greatly exaggerated or did not happen as historians describe. Younger men are especially likely to hold this view (54% of men under 50 vs. 39% of women under 50). Among men over 50, 41% agree, compared with 18% of women over 50. Racial divides are particularly striking:
  • 77% of Hispanic GOP voters
  • 30% of white GOP voters
  • 66% of black GOP voters
• Moon landing: A similarly sized chunk of the Current GOP (36%) believes that the Apollo 11 moon landing was faked by NASA. Again, younger men are more likely to hold this view (51% of men under 50 vs. 38% of women under 50). There are stark racial divides: while only 31% of white GOP voters believe the conspiracy, this rises to 59% among Hispanic Republicans and 63% among black Republicans.

Figure 5: Tolerance for Prejudice in Coalition

A majority of the Current GOP rejects openly racist or openly antisemitic individuals as part of their political coalition. For racism, the margin is 52%–37%: 36% say such individuals are not welcome at all, and another 16% say they may be voters but should not hold positions of leadership. Views are even stronger regarding antisemitism, with the Current GOP rejecting openly antisemitic individuals by nearly 2 to 1 (60%–31%), including almost half (48%) who say they should not be welcomed in the coalition under any circumstances.

Age divides are substantial. Among the Current GOP under 50, a notable minority report that they themselves openly express racist (31%) or antisemitic (25%) views. Among those over 50 in the Current GOP, these figures drop to just 4% for each.

New Entrant Republicans are far more likely to fall into the “tolerator” category. One in three New Entrants (32%) say they openly express racist views, compared with just 8% of Core Republicans. These tolerators are also significantly more likely to believe multiple conspiracy theories and to support political violence. Consistent with their higher likelihood of falling into the Anti-Jewish Republican category, roughly one in three self-identify as either racist or antisemitic.

Tolerators also stand out ideologically. They are more liberal than non-tolerators on a wide range of issues—DEI, taxes, traditional values, and transgender surgeries. Among New Entrant Republicans who tolerate racism or antisemitism, 78% hold liberal policy positions on at least one of these major topics.

These findings underscore a recurring pattern: younger and newer members of the GOP coalition contain a frustrated, alienated subset that is often hostile toward institutions and norms—but not reliably conservative. Some are far-right or otherwise ideological, but many are not conservative at all.

Figure 6: Support for the Justification of Political Violence

The vast majority of the Current GOP (70%) reject the idea that political violence is sometimes justified, while only 30% say that violence can be justified. But the overall number masks a sharp divide between Core Republicans and New Entrant Republicans.

Among Core Republicans, 80% oppose political violence. Among New Entrants, by contrast, 54% say political violence can be justified. Support for political violence is also high among those who believe many conspiracy theories and among those who tolerate openly racist or antisemitic individuals. Age is one of the strongest predictors: just 13% of those over 50 in the Current GOP justify political violence, compared with 57% of those under 50.

Partisan history is another major fault line. One in three in the Current GOP who believe that political violence can be justified are 2020 Biden voters (34%). And six in ten (60%) supporters of political violence previously voted for Obama, Clinton, or Biden, compared with 32% who have never voted for a Democrat.

The Republican coalition’s perceptions of how various groups are treated in American society reveal a mix of consensus and generational divergence. On the whole, Current GOP voters say that society shows about the right amount of concern or favorable treatment for most groups—including men and boys (53%), women and girls (52%), whites (55%), blacks (48%), Asians (61%), Hispanics (56%), Indians (53%), Jews (47%), and legal immigrants (57%).

Two groups stand out as receiving “too much” support:

• Illegal immigrants, where 63% say society is overly favorable; and
• Transgender people, where 55% say the same—along with 49% who believe lesbians and gay men receive too much favorable treatment.

Views toward Muslims are more mixed: 40% believe they receive too much support, 38% believe they receive about the right amount of support, and only 10% say they receive too little.

Christians are the group most widely seen as receiving too little societal support. A plurality (43%) say that Christians receive the right amount of support, but 37% say they receive too little—driven primarily by older Republican voters. Only 22% of those in the Current GOP under 50 believe that Christians receive too little favorable treatment, compared with 47% of those over 50.

Generational divides are similarly sharp on perceptions of Jews. While just 16% of the Current GOP believe that Jews receive too much favorable treatment, fully 26% of those under 50 hold this view—compared with only 8% of those over 50. This pattern aligns with the broader generational cleavage identified throughout the survey: younger and newer members of the coalition are more likely to express skepticism toward many traditional Republican concerns and priorities.

While this survey includes extensive measurement of identity and social attitudes, it also captures a broad policy profile. The battery covers taxation and spending, foreign policy, social issues, illegal and legal immigration, tariffs, DEI policies, and transgender issues.

It is well established that younger and newer Republicans are less pro-Israel than older Republicans. The earlier sections show that they are also more likely to justify political violence, deny the Holocaust, and openly express racist views. Less widely recognized, however, is that these same voters hold less conservative views across a broad range of policy areas—including transgender issues, DEI, and taxation. Given that many of these voters are younger and former Democrats, more progressive policy tendencies are unsurprising.

To further examine this pattern, we looked specifically at New Entrants who exhibit characteristics strongly associated with alienation or far-right politics—such as tolerance for racism or antisemitism and belief in multiple conspiracy theories. Even within these subsets, the result is broadly the same: these voters are not nearly as conservative on major policy questions as the party’s traditional base.

Figure 7: Preferences on Taxes vs. Spending Cuts

By a two-to-one margin, the Current GOP favors cutting government spending (63%) over raising taxes on middle- to upper-income earners (30%). But the overall number masks sharp internal divides. Among those over 50 in the Current GOP, support for spending cuts rises to 73%, while those under 50 in the Current GOP are almost perfectly split. Core Republicans back spending cuts by a margin of 71% to 26%, yet among New Entrant Republicans, the pattern reverses slightly, with a one-point edge for higher taxes (48% to 47%).

These attitudes appear more closely tied to openness to voting Democratic than to affiliation with the MAGA movement. Self-identified MAGA Republicans overwhelmingly support cutting spending (73%), while one of the groups that is most likely to favor higher taxes is of Republicans who currently hold an unfavorable view of Donald Trump.

Figure 8: Preferred Approach to U.S. Foreign Policy

More than two in three members of the Current GOP (67%) support the U.S. taking a proactive role on the world stage—backing peace through strength and maintaining a strong, lethal military. Only 29% prefer a diplomacy-first approach that avoids military intervention unless the U.S. is directly threatened.

Core Republicans support peace through strength at even higher levels (70%). New Entrants, despite their differences from the rest of the coalition, also favor this approach by a margin of 63% to 33%. Hispanic Republicans are especially supportive, with 75% agreeing.

Despite Tucker Carlson’s criticism of U.S. military engagement abroad, his admirers do not share his foreign-policy instincts. Fully 72% of Republicans with a favorable view of Carlson support a proactive, military-forward approach.

This reinforces a pattern seen in earlier sections: views on Tucker Carlson are not strongly tied to tolerance for racism or antisemitism—or foreign-policy attitudes. Peace-through-strength is one of the least polarized issues tested, with strong support across nearly every subgroup. The findings also align with earlier research showing broad Republican backing for President Trump’s strikes against Iran.

Figure 9: Attitudes Toward Traditional, Moderate, and Progressive Social Positions

The Current GOP coalition is split in its posture toward social issues. A plurality (42%) say that the party should fight for traditional values across the board—on gender, sexuality, abortion, and marriage. One in four (24%) believe that the party should push back on “super woke stuff” but accept that some debates, particularly total abortion bans or reversing same-sex marriage, are no longer on the table. One in five (18%) take a “live and let live” position and think social issues should not be a political focus. And one in ten (11%) say the party should support progressive social positions.

Age is the strongest dividing line. Only 25% of the Current GOP under 50 believe that the party should fight for traditional values across the board, compared with 52% of those over 50. Under-50 voters are split almost evenly among opposing super-woke ideas (30%), avoiding social issues entirely (20%), or supporting progressive positions (19%).

These divides track closely with the shift from the pre-2016 GOP to the post-2016 coalition. Nearly half of Core Republicans (49%) support fighting for traditional values, while New Entrant Republicans are split evenly across all four positions. The younger segment of the coalition is not only moving away from an across-the-board traditional-values stance; it is also not united around opposing super-woke social change.

Figure 10: Attitudes Toward Deporting Illegal Immigrants

On illegal migration, the Current GOP coalition is at its most unified. Only 3% say illegal immigrants should not be deported at all. The division comes not over whether to deport, but how it should be done and how aggressively to proceed. Almost four in ten of the Current GOP (37%) favor deporting as many illegal migrants as possible, by whatever methods are necessary. One in three (34%) support deportations but insist that they must be carried out carefully and with due process to avoid wrongful detention or removal. Another 22% believe that deportations should focus primarily on serious criminals rather than families or otherwise law-abiding residents.

Age differences are substantial. Current GOP under 50 are more likely to prioritize due process (36%) rather than adopt an any-means-necessary approach (25%). Among Current GOP over 50, the pattern reverses: 45% back the most aggressive option, while 32% emphasize due process.

Claims that Hispanic Republicans are drifting away from the Trump administration on deportations are not supported by the data. Only 3% oppose deportations outright, and Hispanic Republicans are more likely than the GOP as a whole to support maximum enforcement. Fully 44% back deporting as many illegal migrants as possible.

Figure 11: Attitudes Toward High-Skilled Legal Immigration

Only one in ten of the Current GOP (9%) believe that high-skilled legal immigration should be decreased. Nearly half (47%) say it should be kept at its current level, while 35% say it should be increased. Men are more likely than women to support increasing high-skilled immigration.

Education divides are notable. A majority of college graduates (52%) want high-skilled immigration increased, compared with just 28% of non-graduates; half of non-graduates (50%) prefer keeping levels where they are. The divide between the old and new GOP coalition is similarly stark: 47% of New Entrant Republicans support increasing high-skilled immigration, versus just 31% of Core Republicans.

This is one of several areas where New Entrant Republicans are more progressive. The findings suggest that competition from H-1B visa holders and other skilled immigrants is not driving college-educated New Entrants toward restrictionism. Instead, skepticism toward legal immigration is more concentrated among non-college Republicans, some of whom may be responding to messaging about labor-market competition and wage pressures.

Figure 12: Support for Tariffs 

A slim majority of the Current GOP (54%) support President Trump’s tariffs. Support is notably higher among college graduates (59%), Current GOP over 50 (60%), Core Republicans (62%), Hispanic Republicans (68%), and self-identified MAGA conservatives (73%). Support is lower among Republicans under 50 (45%) and New Entrant Republican voters (45%).

Despite majority support, fully one in four of the Current GOP believe “tariffs are essentially taxes on the American people, raising prices, and failing to help American manufacturing.” Most respondents do express a definitive position on tariffs: only 13% selected the option indicating that they did not care about the policy details and simply wanted lower prices.

Figure 13: Attitudes Toward DEI and Affirmative Action Programs

Six in ten of the Current GOP (59%) believe that Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) and affirmative action programs require racial discrimination and should be illegal. 28% percent say these policies are necessary to remedy past injustice.

Strikingly, support for banning DEI is even higher among black Republicans (65%) and especially high among Hispanic Republicans (70%). New Entrant Republicans are far more divided: 45% say DEI should be illegal, while 46% say these programs are necessary remedies.

Age sharpens the divide. Current GOP under 50 are split—44% say DEI should be illegal and 48% say it is necessary—while Current GOP over 50 overwhelmingly favor making DEI illegal (68% to 16%). The generational divide cuts across gender lines: GOP men and women under 50 are about equally likely to support DEI as to oppose it.

Figure 14: Views on Medical and Surgical Interventions for Transgender Minors

Almost three in four of the Current GOP (72%) believe that children under 18 should not be allowed to receive medical or surgical interventions to move toward gender transition. Only 22% believe they should. Female members of the Current GOP are the most united on the issue: 80% oppose such interventions for minors, compared with 65% of men.

New Entrant Republicans are significantly more liberal. By a narrow 49% to 45% margin, they oppose making transgender procedures for minors illegal—far less conservative than the party’s longstanding voters.

This completes a consistent pattern throughout the survey: New Entrant Republicans are markedly less conservative than Core Republicans across nearly every major policy area tested—transgender issues, DEI, tariffs, high-skilled immigration, deportations, social issues, foreign policy, and taxes.

Figure 15: Comparison of Conservative Positions Across Policy Areas (Core vs. New Entrant GOP)

Figure 16: Views of Israel, Qatar, and China

A majority of the Current GOP (55%) say that Israel is an important and effective U.S. ally. Nearly one in four (23%) say Israel is a country like any other, with which the U.S. sometimes shares interests and sometimes does not. Only 12% say Israel is a settler–colonial state and a liability. Among New Entrant Republicans, negative views on Israel are notably more common (24%), albeit still less prevalent than the belief that Israel is an ally (39%).

Views of Qatar are far more fragmented. The coalition is essentially split four ways, with no clear majority position. New Entrant Republicans are notably more Qatar-friendly (41%) than Core Republicans (23%).

Attitudes toward China reveal another sharp generational and coalition divide. Overall, 28% say that China is a major global power with whom the U.S. must engage, while 17% see China as a country like any other, and 47% view it as a hostile rival that must be treated primarily as an adversary. Under-50 Current GOP are significantly more dovish: 45% see China as a country to cooperate with, compared with just 17% among those over 50.

The gulf between Core and New Entrant Republicans is similarly wide. Core Republicans see China as a country to be opposed rather than engaged by a margin of 60% to 18%. New Entrants reverse that pattern: they see China as a country to cooperate with rather than oppose by 48% to 23%.

Figure 17: Views on Immigrants from India vs. Arab/Muslim-Majority Countries

There is a clear distinction between how the Current GOP views migrants from India and how they view migrants from Arab or Muslim-majority countries. Indian migrants are broadly seen as having embraced American culture and contributed positively to society—by a margin of 52% to 29%. Migrants from Arab and Muslim-majority countries, by contrast, are viewed as having benefited from coming to the U.S. without doing enough to assimilate, by 57% to 26%.

Hispanic Republicans are even more negative toward Muslim immigrants than the coalition overall (68% negative to 19% positive). Current GOP members over 50 are somewhat more favorable toward Indian migrants than under-50’s (54% vs. 48%), but also more skeptical of migrants from Arab countries (61% negative vs. 50%).

Still, demographic variation in perceptions of Indian Americans is relatively modest, and Republicans across the coalition generally see them as a positive force.

Current GOP voters generally do not see elevated dual loyalty among Jewish or Indian Americans. Instead, concerns are more concentrated around Arab or Muslim Americans, Hispanics, and Chinese Americans.

Figure 18: Perceived Foreign Loyalty Among Various Groups

Four in ten members of the Current GOP believe that most or all Arab or Muslim Americans have greater loyalty to a foreign country than to the United States. For every other group, no more than three in ten believe that most or all members are more loyal elsewhere. The same is true of views on Jewish Americans: despite online discourse, only 11% of GOP voters say that nearly all Jewish Americans owe loyalty to a foreign country—essentially identical to perceptions of Italian Americans and Evangelical Christian Americans.

Coalition-wide, differences are modest. Hispanic Republicans are slightly less trusting of Hispanic Americans’ loyalty than others are, but racial and demographic divides are generally weak.

Where distinctions do emerge is between Core Republicans and New Entrant Republicans. In line with their more ambivalent views of Israel, New Entrant Republicans are more likely to see Jewish Americans as having loyalty elsewhere: 38% say most or all do, compared with 24% of Core Republicans. But this skepticism is not confined to Jews—it applies across nearly all groups except Arab or Muslim Americans. The pattern suggests that New Entrants to the GOP coalition are broadly less trusting and more negative about many groups, rather than harboring group-specific concerns.

Looking ahead to 2026, 2028, and beyond, the durability of the expanded Republican coalition is uncertain—especially when it comes to its newest members. When asked how they would vote if a congressional election were held today, only 56% of New Entrant Republicans said they would definitely vote Republican again, and 28% said they probably would. Under-50 Republicans show similar softness: just 59% say they would definitely vote GOP in a House race, and one in ten say they would vote for a Democrat.

The more established bloc of Republican voters remains far more reliable. In the 2022 midterms, 70% of Republican primary voters were 50 or older. Even in the higher-turnout 2024 presidential year, they still made up 60% of the GOP primary electorate. And while Core Republicans constitute 65% of all Republicans in this survey, they are likely to be even more overrepresented in future primary electorates—both because they tend to be older and because they possess more stable partisan ties, even if they are less visible on social media.

The authors would like to thank Sam Kay for his contributions to the analysis.

Photo: Marie Hickman / The Image Bank Unreleased via Getty Images